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Abstract
This paper characterizes price competition between an expert and s non-expert.
In contrast ivith thc r.xpert, the non-expert's reperir technology is not always suc-
ce.}sful. C'onsumers visit the expert after experiencing an crosuccessful match at
the non-expert. This re-entry affects the behavior of both sellers. For low enough
prohabilitv of successful repair at the non-expert, all consurners first risit tho
non-e~7~ert, and a "timid-pricing" equilibrium results. If the non-expert's repair
teclmology performs well enough, it pays for some consumers to disregard the non-
expert a visit. They directly go to the expert's shop, and an "aggressive-pricing"
erluihbrium pops ap. Pór intermediate i~lues of the non-expert's surcrssful re-
pair a "mised-pricing" equilibrium emerges u~hcre the c;~pert randomizes over the
monopoly price and some Inwer price.
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1 Introduction
What. do t.he following have in common? (1) buying a new good after having spent a
considerable amonnt of money in trying t,o repair an old good; (2) visiting t.he specialist
after having wasted one's time at t.he general practitioner; (3) arranging a divorce via
a lawyer after spending time and money nsing a mediator; (4) buying gemrine spare
parts after having wasted money on imitation parts; (5) trying to fix an object doing-it-
yonrself and afterwards needing to visit a craftsman. Answer: they all describe situations
in which t.rying to save money potentially tttrns out t.o be very costly. In other words,
consnmers face the choice between visiting an expert. directly and first trying t,o solve the
problern using a non-expert. The lat.ter action has the potent.ial drawback of ending up
anyway in a visit to the expert. These real-life situations raise a nnmber of interest.ing
qnestions- What. does cnmpetition between the expert and non-expert look like? Will
the expert. only ~um at cnstomers the non-expert. failed t.o help? What prices will they
charge? What quality level will the non-expert offer? Wlrich consumers will be served by
whom"? The pnrpose of this paper is to provicíe answers to these qnestions by modelling
price competit.ion between an expert and a non-expert.
To be more precise, this paper characterizes price competition in a special type of
dnopoly in which consumers look for a snecessfiil match. The dnopolists are denoted as
the expert and the non-expert. The consumers' tnat.dr with the expert's good is always
successfirL The non-expert's good snccessfirlly matches the consnmers' needs only with
some commonly known probabilit.y. With the remaining probability t.he match is not
snccessful. In other words, tlte non-expcrt sells an experience good: its qua,lity is ktwwn
only after consumption. All consumers attach a common positive valne to a successfiil
match, bnt assign no valne if the match was nnsnccessfitl. They seek t.o minimize their
expected expenditnres. Therefore, they can go immediately for the expert.'s good and
thus face only one purchase dcrision. Alternatively, t.hey may choose for the non-expert's
good, anticipating the risk of an unsuccessfitl match. In the event of a bad mat.ch,
these constrmers re-enter the market since bygones are forever bygones. If the non-
expert. fails to successfirlly match a consumer's needs, however, another visit at his store
yields no success with probability one. That is, the non-expert's matching technology
is characterized by perfect correlation. Therefore, these consumers' only choice is to
purchase the expert's good. Summing up, the constuners make a ptrrchase decision underimcertainty: going directly for the expert's goorl may be imnecessary, while bnyiug the
services of t.he non-expert may tairn out. to be a pnre waste.
The above examples fit the general model as follows. Consider compet.ition between
a craftsman and a handyman. A craftsman always repairs snccessfully. By cont.rast,
a handyman's repair technology is imperfect.. A consnmer, therefore, may titrn t.o the
craftsman after experiencing an urrsuccessfiil match at. t.he handyman. A second example
concerns competit.ion between a repair shop and a shop selling new goods. A consumer's
decision to patch up his broken car depends on the probabilit,y of snccessfiil repair, the
price of patching iip, and the price of a new car. Third, t.he model also shows some insight
regarding price competit.ion between a store selling low quality products and anot,her
store selling high quality products: only the low qnality store sells a prochcct t.hat may
break down or is incompatible with anot,her product with some probabilit.y. Fonrth,
rousider the market for mecíical services. General practitioners argne t.hat a mandatory
referral prevents patients from a needless visit. to the more expensive specialist. The
latter argne, however, that. if patients are allowed to visit. the specialist withont the
manda.t.ory referral of t.he general practitioner, it keeps them from making two visits.
Finally, t.he do-it:yourself shops compete with professional repair servica5. A consumer
can fix an object himself by pnrchasing services at the do-it-yonrself shop in order t.o
rednce expencíit,iires. This decision, however, may tnrn ont. either to bc cheap or very
expensive. The latter happens if, after all, the ccistomer has to call on a professíonal
repairer.
~~'e stndy this problem in a simpl~~ hnriznntal differc~ntiatien m~~~lc~l aucl n~so Hotclling's
line as onr ïramework. The consnmers are uiriformly distribnted along the nnit inter~-al.
The t.wo sellers are located at the extremes of this interval; the non-exhert is at the left
extreme and the expert at the right extrernc. The Hoteliing set np shoidd be sc-en as a
representation of different models. These alternative models yield very similar demancl
fimctions, and hence qnalit.atively comparable eqnilibria. The first. alt.ernative is a model
where corrsnmers face different. costs in the event. of switching from t.he non-expert to the
expert.. Consumers with a high switching cost are more inclined t.o visit. irnmediately thc
expert. In contrast, t.hose with low switching costs take t.he risk of experiencing first the
services of the non-expert. Secondly, consumers may differ with respect t.o their time
preference. Those consnmers having a high rat,e of time prefereuce are more eager t.o3
visit. the expert at once than are t.he consumers with a low time preference. Thirdly,
individnals may perceive cíifferences in the probability of being successfiilly matched by
thc non-expert. Cnstomers with a high perceived probability of snccess at. t.he non-expert
will be morc inclined t.o show np there first.
The analysis shows tkrat t.hree types of eqnilibria can occur. In the first eqnilibriiun,
some consnmers prefer to first visit the non-expert, while others directly visit. the expert.
This happens when the horizont.al differentiation is high enough and the non-expert.'s
repair tc~c~hnology is sufficient.ly snccessfirl. The intuition is that the expert's residiral de-
mand of "faihrres" becomes very small when the non-expert becomes a close substit~it.e.
This cqnilibrium is in pnre st.rat.egies. Both firms adopt an "aggressive-pricing" strat;
egy, since the expert competes in a direct way wit.h the non-expert.. That is, t.he expert
at.tracts consumers direct.ly to his shop in addition to the non-expert's faihcres. More
specifically, the expert persnades consnmers wit,h an "address" close to his. By tlus we
mean consnmers that. feel "close to him" - those with high switching costs, a high rat.e
of time preference, or a low probability of snccess at the non-expert.. Those consnmers
who visit the expert directly prefer a high price and certainty of repair. The otlcers
prefer the gamble of a low price at the non-expert. and possibly on top of that t.he high
price of the expert and additional transport.ation costs. We show that the non-expert
has incentives to imderinvest in liis repair t.echnology if the parametric environment snp-
ports the "aggressive-pricing" eqnilibrium. On the one hand, there is a positive dernand
effect. of providing a better technology, as the non-expert becomes more attractive t.o all
consnmers. The demand effect. is not. particirlarly strong, as cnstomers close t.o t.he non-
expert. valne a lugher qnality more t,han t.hose located at the expert. On the other hand,
a technology improvement generates a negative strategic effect.. This resnlts from two
forces. First, it. becomes less attractive for the expert to specialize on the non-expert's
faihues, and the non-expert becomes less vertically differentiated as he improves npon his
quality. Second, the probability of ending up at the expert decreases snch that. the im-
portance of transportation costs, determining the stibstitirt,ability between both sellers,
increases.
In the second type of eqnilibrinm, the expert. adopts a mixed strategy where he
charges with some probabilit.y a low price. With the remaining probability, he charges
the monopoly price. In this event, all consirmers first visit the non-expert. The non-a
expert, however, adopts a pnre strategy gieen the expert.'s mixed st.rat.egy. In this
"mixed-pricing" eqnilibrinm, the expert's profit. is independent of the actnal price he
charges. This eq[rilibrinm occtus for low enongh degrees of horizontal different.iat.ion and
int.errnediate probabilities of successfiil repair.
For snfficiently low probabilities of snccessful repair at. the non-expert, a"timid-
pricing" equilibrinm occ[trs. In this eqnilibritun, the firrns' pricing strat.eg~ies are "timid":
the non-expert can charge a krigh price since the expert. finds it. optimal to serve only
t.he non-expert.'s "faihrres" at. t.he monopoly price. Both sellers specialize on t.heir own
market. segment without. oompeting direct.ly. The expert. specializes in the faihrres of t.he
non-expert., whereas the non-expert specializes in giving all consumers a first. try. In t.he
environment where the "t.imid-pricing" eqnilibrium holds, the non-expert. has incentives
t.o npgrade his repair technology. The reason is that. it. allows him t.o increase his price
wit.hont. affecting his demand, as both suppliers do not compete in a direct. way.
The welfare analysis makes it clear t,hat when the expert inetrrs a snfficient cost
disadvantage, t.he market. outcome in the "aggressive-pricing" eqnilibrinm restilts in too
marry consnmers directly visiting the expert. The opposite happens for low enough cost
differences. In t.he "timid-pricing" eqnilibrinm, the market. outcome is optimal whenever
the tsansportation costs are lo~~- relat.ive~ to the cost differenc~es betweeu both snppliers.
Consnmers shonld be forced to visit. t.he expert direc~tly in the opposite c~ase.
Sorne governments have established rnaudatory health care referral; consnmers arc~
forced t,o first visit a general practitioner before visiting a specialisY.t The OECD (1994)
discusses t.he healt.h care referral syst.em as follows: "It developed in t.he nineteenth
rent.ttry in England where t.here were two c~lasses of doctors ... The "ethical" principlc
of referral w~LS agreecí npon after t.he general practitioners threatened not. to refer to
consttltants for fear of losing patients to them." (nECD (1994), op rit p. '~7). This
fear of losing patients wonld bc~ in line with an "aggressive-pric~ing" c~qnilibrinm, as
then health rare consumers decide to go direct.ly to the specialist. Tlte lobbying for
mandatory referral by the general practitioners allows then to avoid the "aggressive-
pricing" eqnilibrinm. Pnre welfare considcrations, of conrse, conld also be the driving
tAccording to the OECD (1994), syst.ems of [nandator}' referral exist in 1990 for Austsia, Austaalia.
Canada, Denmazk. Finland, Greece, Ital}. New Zealand, `orwa}, PortngaL Scveden, and Turke~ (OECD
(1991)). Free choice exists in Iceland. .Iapan, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the US.J
forre behind the absence~presence of referral systems.
Alenrer and Stalrl (1994) c~ousider a market. with t.wo firms, eac~h selling a horizontally
cíifferentiated good. hr their model, consumers eit.her experienoe a good or a bad match.
Cousnmers experienc~ing a bad match, however, never re-enter t.he market. This paper, in
c~ontrast, allows consumers to rcent.er the market. after experiencing a bad match. Tlce
c.onsnmers are horizontally differentiat.ed arrd two firms sell a vertically differentiated
produc~t. The probability of a siia~essfiil match serves as a measnre for qnalit.y: at.
c~cpial expenditnres every c~onsnmer prefers the expcrt.'s good. hfenrer and St.ahl's (1994)
c~xarnples apply in this mocíel if we make some modificat.ions: e.g. low quality machiuery
and equipment rnay break down and become irreparable. The valne of a good match after
this brcakdown, however, may still be positive. Buying high qnality after the breakdown
of the low qnality machinery, therefore, can bejnstified. In a somewhat. different context,
Lal rcrrd IV[a1.ul.es (1989} consider price competition bet.wa:n two stores, each selling thc~
same assort.ment of two iudependent goocís. In t.heir model, t.wo types of c~onsumers
exist. In one crclirilibrinm, the two stores charge t.he same firll price for the assortment,
bnt different. prices for each good in t.he bundle. Poor c~onsumers bny each procíuct at.
the store c~harging the cheapest. price and, therefore, re-entsr the market. aft.er their first.
piuchase at oue of the two stores. Rich consumers, however, never shop aronnd; they
never re-enter t.he market. In this paper, there is only one type of consumer. In additiou,
the stores sel] vertically differentiated goods. Some cocrsumers visit both firms as thcy
find it. ex ante optimal t.o t.ry out. the non-expert's good.
In contrast with most of the literatnre on credenc~e, cxperienc~e, or so.Lrc~h goocls, this
pape~r abstrarts from sellers' inc~entives t.o provide the right, amount. of ynality in the
service, repair, or product offered.z There is no asymrnet.ric information or search cost
involved in t.he model. Consumers and prochrcers know the probability of sncc~essfid
match at the two stores. Their technology is taken as a given. The paper also abst.rac~ts
from t.he possibility of warranties for t.he low quality good. Tlris assnmption can be
jnst.ified as "qnality may be impossible or very cost.ly to measiue for a c~.onrt. ... [or~
enforcement costs [are~ incommens~uate with the issne" (Tirole (1988), p. 106). We
2Wolinsky (1993), Emons (1994), and Taylor (1995) analyze features of mazket diagnoses and treat-
ments. The seminal papet on experience goods is Nelson (1970). Tirole (1988) offers an overview of
modeLs with experience and seazch goods.G
do, Itowever. analyze whethcr the non-expert fac.es inceutivc~ t.o irnprove~ npon ]tis repair
tec hnology.
The remainder of the paper pror~ecxls ~i,ti follows. Section 2 offers thc model. 'I'hc~
demand analysis follows in Sect.ion 3, while c~cluilibrinm is c~haracterized in Sec~tiou 4.
Section 5 provicíes some welfare c~onsiderations. SE~c'tion G makes some ronc~luding re-
nrarks. Finally, Sec~tion 7 contains all proofs.
2 The Model
Consider a linear market of lengt.h one All consumers are located nniforrnly along this
intc~rva] and own a good nec~ding a repair. All c~onsnmers have a c~ommon (reservation)
vahre r for };ett.ing the goocl fixed, and minimize their repair expenditures. They inc~nr a
linear t.rausportation cost t per tmit of length. The density of c~onsctmers is normalized to
one. Therc are two sellers. The first seller (t,he non-expert) is loc~ated at thc left. extretne
of the interval (.r~ - 0) and sells at, prir~e q. He tepairs snt`cessfiilly with probability
0 c ~ c 1, aud liis marginal r~ost of production is normalized t.o zero.3 Thc~ repair
tec}urolo};y is r~harac~terized b~~ perfec~t correlation bet.wern two or rnore visits t,o thc~ uon-
expert's storc for every c~onscuuer. That is, if the non-e?xpert fails to repair a c~oustnnt~r's
;;ood. a sec~ond re~pair at his st.ot'e }'iclcls failnre wit h probability one. The other seller
(thc~ expr~rt) is located at thc othc~r extrc~me of the ittterval (:r - l) anrl alw~ivti rc~pairs
sna~essfitlly at. pric~e p. The expc~rt h.~ti a constaut tuarginal proclncaion cost rtf c ~ 0.'
E~'c~rc c~onsnmer has to rhrlosc~ brt~x~een two possible ac~tions. Thc~ first ac~tion is to visit
t-hc~ expert's store imrnerliately. ~Vith Tlvs action, the c~onsnmer at locat.ion z, obtains a
snrphts of r- p- t(1 - z). The other choice ia to go to t.hc uorr-cxpc~rt first. A sur'c~c:tisfnl
rc~pair at tltis store yic~lds a c~onsimu~r at loc~:tition z a srtrphts of r - q- tr. If thc~ rr,pair
~tThe location oE the two providers at the extremes of the line is not reall~~ restrictive, eapecially if
~cr reconsider the alternative morlr~ls put forward in the inrroduction. In particul:,u. cr~nsamers ~~ith an
.uldress" close to the non-expert (expert) can be interpreted as constuners with Ir~w (high) s~cirching
costs. The same applies for the opportunit}' cost of time interpretation: thuse living close to the expert
are rrpr~,ontatieo for cousumers with a high time preference. Finalh~. cunsumers ~~-ith a luw probabilit~
of succesful repair at the non-expert could be considered as havin~ their location close to thc expert.
'The ~'aluc of c can be interpreted as the difference beta.een the expert's and the non-expert's
marginal costs.!
~caa5 not snccessfirl, another visit to the non-expert's store is nseless; the characteristics
of thc repair tcchnology imply zero probabilitv of snccess. Therefore, the consnmer re~-
entcss t.he market, and decides whether to visit t.he expert's st.ore or not.. If he visits the
c.rpert.'s st.ore, t.he consnrner pays, however, t.he additional amonnt of p f t(I - z).~' His
c~x ante expected nt.ility, as a conseqnence, amonnts to
r-q-tz-(1-ry)(ptt(1-z)).
Accordingly, the consnmer located at ~ is indifferent. bet.ween t.hese t.wo artions if
4ttyt(I-ry)(ntt(I-y))-nft(I-zi),
wlrere ~ E[0, I] eyuals




To complete the set,np of the model, the expert. cannot dist.inguish buyers once they
cnter his store: bnyers having experienced an tmsuccessfnl repair at. t,hc non-expert ancí
entering the expert.'s st.ore are identical t.o consumers following the first action. The
expert cannot, therefore, makc~ his price cotttingent on sucL informatiou.
The next section provides a complete characterization of bot.h firms' clemancl riuvo.
3 Demand Analysis
For a fixecí vahre of p, say p, the non-expert's (contingent) demand ciirvc is definc~cí ati
0 if4?1(Pft)
~,~(P, 4) - J if ry(P -I- t) ~ 4 1 ryp - t
I ifryp-t~q.
The non-expert.'s demand is continuotts and piecewise linear. Three possible price re-
gions have to be distingcrished. In the first., the non-expert's demand eqnals zero if the
~'We ~rill assume r to be large enough, so that the option not to visit the expert disappears.x
consnmer located at. 0 finds it more profitable t.o visit the expert. first. In the second,
a posit.ive fract.ion y of the consnmers finds it profitable to cisit t.he non-expert first at
a lower price q. Finally, when t.he price q is snfficient.ly low, the non-expert.'s demand
ec{nals one since all consumers find it. profitable t.o visit him first.





1- ryy if (s f t)~7 ~ 1, ~(~~~r) - t
1 if (q~ry) - t ~ p.
(3)
The expert's demand is cont.inuous and piecewise linear. It consists of five price regions.
In the first constellation of this demand schedule, no consnmer visits the expcrt's st.ore.
In the second one, all consumers first visit the non-expert. IV1orc distant. consurners,
however, prefer not. to visit. the expert. if faihcre at the non-expert. occnrred. For example,
the consnmer at location 0 will never biry at the expert's store; doing so woiild at most
yield hcr negative nt.ility. In the t.hird constcllat.ion, all consnmers first visit the non-
expert and, if necessary, bny at. the expe~rt. The fourth price constellat.ion of the demancí
schednle shows that consiuners t.o the left. of y first visit. the uon-expert. aud, if nec essary,
the expert. The ot,her consumers immediately go to the expert's store. Notice that t.he
t.hird and fonrth price region destroy tlre eonettivity in t.he exl~~ert's dernand curve. For
extremely low prices, as in the last price region, the expert serves the whole market.
Figure 1 illustrates the corresponding price regions. As defined in Ey. (3), it assnmes
t.hat r- t 1 (q -I- t)~ry. Thus, if the expert charges the price p- r- t, all consnmers
first visit the non-expert. That. is, at. p~ r- t the expert can only attract "faihues."
It follows from khe above demand analysis that. total market. demand D„(7~, q) f DQ(7~, q)







Figure I: The expert's inverse demand curve
A different. sitnatiou occurs when (qf t)~ry 1 r- t. If p - r- t, some consumers visit.
the expert directly. In this event, the vertical line of the inverse demancl in Fignre 1 at.
1- ry disappears. If (q f t)~ry ~ r- t~ p, all failures st.ill visit t.he expert. If, however,
(q f t)~ry 1 p~ r- t some consiuners who experienced a bacl rnatch at. the nou-expert.
do not. visit the expert. anymore. In particular, those consumers snfFiciently close to zero
incur a negative ntility from doing so. Since this paper aims at. dis~~i~ssiug when it. is
optimal for all consnmers to first. visit the non-expert. before the expert, we will onlv
consider the situation where (q -~ t)~ry c r- t. In the next. sect.ion, Assiunptions 1 and
2 make clear that this implies a restaic tion on the paramet.ers.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
To get some intiution from t.he start, consider first the case.in the absence of horizontal
differentiation (t - 0). On the one hand, the expert. is able to guarantee hirnself a
minimum profit. by serving the faihrres from the non-expert and charging the reservation
valne r. On the other hand, the expert can aim at attsact.ing the entire market. directly
by offering slightly better conditions than the non-expert.. This generates a discontinuity10
in the expert's best-rc~sponse fimction. Therefore, a mixecl eqnilibrium re~sirlts in ~ahich
the expert c~harges with sorne probability the reservation valnc~ r and with thc~ remaining
probability the marginal production rost r. ~~'e come bac~k to this case at thc~ encl of this
se~~t.ton.
Now retnrn to the c~ase wit.h horizontal clifferentiation. ~íe proe~eecí as follows. ~~'e first
dis~~nati the btst,response fimetions of both sellers. After that, we tnrn to thc~ clifferent
c~cluilihria. Lct us start witli the following two assnmptions:
Assumption 1: r~ 2t f c.
Assumption 2: r 1 2t(í f ry)~ry.
Assnmption 1 gnarantees that. t,hc expert. would serve t.he whole market if he were in
a monopoly posit.ion. Thc seconcí assnrnption implies t.hat. if t.he expert c~harges the
monopoly price p- r- t, the non-expert. finds it optimal to ser~~e t.he whole market. In
other words, if thc expert charges the monopoly pricc~, all consnrners fincí it optimal t.o
first ~.isit ihe non-c:xpert. If 2t~c? ~~, it is snfficient. if the ~~ottsnmers' reser~~ation valn~.
satisfics Assiunption 2. Otlicrwisc~, .4ssiunption 1 ia siiffi~~ient. At pri~~e ~- r~ - t, all
~~orz.5nu~e~rs ~~ ho had an irnsnrcessfnl tnat~h at the non-expert's store find it also ~~ptimal
to visit the expert.. Therefore, at the monopoly pri~~e t.he espert only servcs the failuros.
Frnm Ey. (2) t.he non-expcrt.'s profit fnu~~tion oc~uals
~,~(4-P) - 4n„(P.7) (4)
and is routinnons and c~oncave in tlre non-c~xpert~'s pri~r q. Lernma 1 ~~}iaraeterizes thc
non-oxpert', bc~tit-respensc fim~~~tion.
Lemma L'I~L~~ non-~~xpc~rt'.ti~ best-responsr~ function equals 2„(p) - max~0.5r(p~f), ~ip-
t].
Lemma 1 shows that the uon-expert chooses eithcr t.o ser~-e the whole tnarket or part r,f
it. Lemma 1 ímplies that if p G p- t(2 f7)~y, the non-expert does not sc~r~~e the wholc
market. If, howe~~er, p 1 T~, it. is optimal for the non-expert. to scrve all consnrnc~rs. It
follows from Lemma 1 that the se~ond part of Eq. (2) of tho non-oxpert's demancl is thc~11
only relevant one siuce he will never set. any y c 7~p - t or ry(p f t) G q.
From Ey. (3) the expert's profit. fnnc~tion eqnals
~e(P, 4) - (P - c)De(P, 9). (J)
Eqnation (5) is contimrons bnt non-concave in t.he expert's price p. However, dne to
the form of the expert's demand firnc:tion, Eq. (5) only shows t.wo possible peaks. The~
c,xpert's best. response is t.o pick the maximnm of these t,wo pexrks. In partic~iilar, hc
c hooses arnoug the following alt,ernatives. The first possible peak occurs whenever the
expert serves only the non-expert.'s "faihrres," that is y~ 1. Then, the expert. charges
r- t dnc to t.he inelasticity of the third part of Eq. (3). Actnally, the expert, is able
t.o gnarantee himself t.his profit by specializing iu only the failirres. In this event., the
expert.'s demand is given by the thircí price region in Eq. (3) and eqnals 1- ry. Therefore,
if the non-expert serves the whole market, the expert's profit eqnals
ne(r - t,9) - (T - t - c)(1 - ry). (~)
A second possible peak occ~irrs at. one of the t.wo following mnt.nally c~xc~hisive alternatives.
First, the expert c~harges a price snch that. some but. not all consnrners visit. hirn direc~tl~..
That is, fl c y G L In this price re~iou the expert's profit fimction is qnadratic~ ancl
cxtnals
~e(P,7) - (P-c)(I -7y).
The first:order c.ondition for the r.h.s. of Eq. (7) whenever it applies is definc~l ~ti
(7)
~(q) - P- t~ ry(g f t) --y~~(t - r:) S)
~ 2ryZ (
The price p(q) is inereasing in the non-expert's price y. It is, however, dec~re~LSing in thc~
probabilit.y of snccess of the non-expert. Second, the expert charges a price snch that. he
immediately attracts all oonsnmers, i.e. y- 0. His optimril pric~e bc~c.omes q~ry - t, as a
lower price does not. generate additional demand.
Define
yc - ry(c - t) - t(1 - 1~7), (9)12
qh - 7C f t(I f 7~- (I~7)), (10)
~(7) -~~t(I --r'~)(T - t - ~.) f 7(e f t) - t(í f I~7), (I I)
:md
~1- 7((r - t - ~)(I - 7) f t f ~). (i2)
Comparisou of the two pot.ent.ial peaks yielcís t.he expert's best response. Lemrna 2 char-
ae~t.crizc~s t.he expert.'s best: responsc~ ftmction.
Lemma 2: TLe r~xpert's best-response fnnrtion is
P-
r-t ifOcyGgi
r- t if qr G q G min(q(ry), 9r,)
P(7) if max(9r, 9(1)) C 4 C 9h
r-t ifqr,CqCrj
4~ry - t ifrnax(qr„ rj) G q.
(13)
Lemma 2 shows t,hat if the pric~e of the uon-expert. is snfficient.ly lo~r., it is opt.imal
tr1 c~harge tliat. price not exc~c~eciing sorne consnmer's willingness to pay, and serve only
thc~ non-cxpert.'s failnres. Thns, all c~onstuncrs first. go to the non-expert.; conseqncntly.
tLc~ expert ser~~es only ronsnmers ~~~ho had an unstu~cc~ssfnl match at the non-expert.
Tltis is thc~ r~~se in tlre first and thirci region of Eq.(13). The expert's best response for
intermc~cliate q is to priee snc~h that Ire directly attracts a snffic~íent frac~tion of c~ousnrners.
In other words, sorne consnrners first go to the non-expert., while others go clirectly to
thr~ expert. The cxpert has to attrnrt a snbstantial frac~tion, and tLns miitit cl~~r~re:LSr~
significantly his pric~c This or'cnrs in tlre third region of Eq.(13). A tlrird strategy whic~li
is optimal given that the non-expert sets a relati~.el~. high price, is to ask a prir~e snch
tlrat. he at.t.ru~ts all c~onsnmers immediately. This ocr'nrs in the fifth regiou ofEq. ( 13). In
sinn, lemrna 2 implics that tLe expert will ne~-cr charge a prir e exccrding some consnmer's
willingness to pay, i.e. p c r- t. Li addition, he will never c~harge a lower pricc~ than
that one already attracting the entire market, i.e. p 1 q~ry - f. Tlnts, the expert's best
retiponse is bet~~~een g~r- t and r- t. That is, only- the third and foitrth pric~c~ region in
Ey. (3) are relevant..13
In essence, the expert's choice is whet.her to serve only failnre~s or not. If he serves
atly faihtres, there is no need t.o compet.e fiercely for consnmers: an increase in the pric~e
p cloes uot. affec~t. ltis clemand. Henc~e, by charging the monopoly price p- r- t, the
expc~rt aelopt.s a"t.imicí-pricing" strat.egy. The other choiae for the expert is to charge a
pric~e that will allow some ~onsnmers visit him direc~tly. If the non-expert's price is high,
c~onsnrners are more willing t.o visit. the expert's store directly. In this case, by adopting
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Figure 2: The best-response functions
Fignrc~ 2 ilhtst.rates the best,response fimctions of both sellers. Thc expcrr.'s best-
response fimction st,arts at p- r- t and remains horizontal for all prices to the left
of max(q~, min(q(ry), qt,)). At t.his point, the best response shows oue of t.he follow-
ing t.wo mntually exchrsive downward jiunps. The first occurs at max(y~,q(ry)) for all
max(yt, q(ry)) G qh. It becomes opt.imal for the expert to attract some consnmers di-
rectly to his shop. The expert's best. response increases in a linear way. Figitre 2 shows
the situation where max(qi, min(q(ry), qh)) - q(ry). The second possible downward jrunp
oc~cnrs at. max(qh, q) if max(qh, q)C q.This downward jump occurs since it becomes opti-
mal for the expert. to attsact. all consnmers directly to his shop. The non-expert's bc. ~st.14
response is increasing, continnons, and shows a kink at y- p.
f3efore cíisciLSSing the different. equilibria, we can nrle ont t.he following cases. Setting
a price snch that the expert serves direc~t.ly the entire market can never be a pure strat.egy
rK~nilibrinm. In this e~~ent, the non-expert. re.alizes zero profits which gi~-r:s him an iucen-
tive to reclnce his price. Thns, parts (4) and (5) of Eq. (13) never yield a pnre strategy
rY{iiilibrium. We arc now ready to focns on t.he different equilibria. We clistingnish t.hree
typcs of c~c{nilibria as a 6mct,ion of whether t.he non-expert's repair tc~c~hnology y is high,
intsrrnediate or low.
Proposition 1: There is a 0 G ryA G 1 such that some rnnsumers ~o ríirectly to thr~
c~~pr~rt if thc~ probabifity ofsuccess ry at t6c non-expert is at least y,4. In this pure strate~y
"n~ressirc~-pricin~" cquilibrium (Pá~9n) it holds that
y~(zr~ - t) -~ zryt f 2r , i~~(~ ~ t) f( t f-y)t
P.n - 3,i:z 9,t - 3ry
TLr non-expr~rt's ma~rket share in this `~~~gressivc-pricing" cquilibrium eyuals
tl G~'-
cry` f( 1 -F ry f ry~)t G 1. ;~.i - 3ryt(1 f 7)
(14)
Thc dotted liue iu Fignre 2 illnstrates tlre uon-expert's br~t~response fimction in thr
"aggressivc-pricin~' ccpiilihrium. Sornc cr7nsimlcrs prefer to clircx~tly visit. thc cxpert's
store. Not tinrprisingly, p~ 1 q"~. The expert charges at. lcast. as high a price as thc
nrm-expert. 1'he expert's profits, ho~~.e~.er, excsed the non-cxpcrt's pro~.iclerl r in not. r.oo
largc. Of cunrse, fot c- 0 ancl ry- 1. thcir pricc:ti and profits coiuciclc. f3otli pricos
iucrease with the expert's marginal cost c and t.hc: rate of tranportation cost t. Alore
c~onsnmers clirect.ly visit the expert when the cost of transportation iucre~uses, while t.he
opposite happens when the expert,'s cost increase~. Not,e that when t approache~ zero,
Ec{. (14) cloes no longer sat.isfy the boimdaries. The reason is that. clemand becomes
very pricr~elastic snch that the expert is st.imulated to undercnt. t.he non-expert.. Wc







Fig. (3a): c-0, t-1, r-10
r
Fig. (36): c-0, t-2, r-10
Y
Fig. (3a): c-1, t-2, r-10
Fignrc 3: The relevant. ranges of ry in t.he "aggressive-pricing" equilibriiim1 fi
i?sing some representati~~e nnrnerical exarnples. Figures 3a-c ilhtstrato the rele~.ant
rangc~s of ~ for u.hic~h an `'aggressi~~e-pric~ing" eqiulibrium exists. Thc~ horizonral axis de-
pic~ts thc valucs for ~. The vertieal axis shows the non-exhert's pric~e q,q from Proposition
1, r~(ry) as dcfined in Ey. (11), and t.he non-expert's pric-e ~(r - t) - t when the expert
~~harges his monopoly price. They are indicated by [1]. [2], aucí [3], respect.ively. Since any
cynilibrium rnust satisfy Assnmption 2, a necessary ronditiou is that ry~ y. In addition.
the follo~~~ing r~ondition shonld hold: qi c y(r - f) - i~. Eqnivalc~ntly, ry~~yc - t~(r - r).
Finally. 0 C i~;t c 1 in any "aggressiv~pric~ing" equilibrinm. This is ednivalent. to ry a c ry.
Therefore, t.he horizontal axis is only relevant for valucs of ry~ tnax("ry. ryt, ryA). Fignres
3a-c sho~- tltere is an "aggressive-pricing" eqnilibriirm if q(ry) C yA. That, is, for all
~) ryá. As an cxample, take Figurc 3a. The probabilit.y of suc~cess at. the non-expert.
is at least. ry;t ti Q.934 in any "aggressive-pricing" eynilibrinm. Thns, the probabilit.y
of a sncccssful matc~,h of the non-expert. should be high enongh. The intnition is that.
a relativcly sncc~essfiil non-c~xpert is a c~lose snbstitnte for the expert. In other words,
t]te expcrt's residual demand for "faihtres" hecoines ~-ery small. As a c~onseynenc~e, the
c:tlx,rt finds it mnch less attracti~~e to c~ttarge t.he monopoly pric~e Fignres 36 - r are
interpreted iu a sitnilar c~.av.
Suppose there exists a first st.cgo in ~c-ltich the non-expert. oould decide on the ynality
of lriti repair tec~lmology, ltefore c~ompeting iti pric~es. What quality level woitld the non-
c~xpert oiferY ~~Vithin thc~ environtneut for which the '`aggressi~-cLpricing" equilihrinm
exists, the overall result is dotermined bti~ two opposing effec,ta. On thc~ onc~ hand, u higlter
-, indnc~es a tio,itive dern:cnrl effec~t. Au inc~rease in ry shifts and rotatcs thr~ nr7n-expert's
best. replp occt.wards. Thc re.r5on is that the attrac~tiveness of t.he non-c.~xpert inc~reases for
all consnmers, as the qnality diffe~renc~e betwcen both scllers d~~rc~:LSes. Tluts. the ~-ertic~al
differentiation bet.ween both sellers dc~c~rc.Lties- Thc dc,mand effect, Lowcwc~r, is not ~~ery
latge, as c~onsnmers locat.ed c~lose to the espert value an increatie in ~ Ic~s than those
loc~ated closP t.o the non-expcrt. On the other hand, an inc~rease in y generat.es a negati~~e
stratc~gir effec~t; the expert.'s best. responsc~ shifts and rot.ates inwards. This resiilts frorn
the interplay of a recíuction in vertical aud an inc~rease in horizonta] differentiation. An
increase in ~y reduc~es the qnality difference betnveen the turo sellers and rhanges t.he
importanc~e of t.ransport.ation c~osts i.e. horizontal differentiation: it makes c~onsnrrters
Ic.SS likely to s~n-itc~h from onc~ seller to the other dne to the decrease in probahility of17
c~uclin~ np iu a ~~isit at t bo e~xpc~rt. Tlins, tbe uou-c:~pc~rt. sbonlcl nncierinv~st in tbc~ qnalit.y
~~f llis rc~pair tc~c~lntolo~y in orclcr to clatupeu tlrc~ a~;Krc:vsivc, mspouse by tlrc c~zpc~rt. (h~.
ilsiu~h tbc~ Fnclcnbc~rg-Tirolc (1cJ8~) tc~rminology, tbe non-crpcrf slronlcl bchavc~:r.ti a pnppy.
clon iu Lis rc~pair tc~c~hnolo~y clec~isiou. TIIe overall cffec~t on thc~ uon-expc~rt's profits of au
iuc rease in -~ is ambiRnons.
(hcr moclel iu ~~-llic~h c~onsnmers rc~enter to visit the expert provides cíifferent iusi~hts
than a mociel in ~ti.hic~h c~onsnmers after having failecí at tlre non-expert ~~-olilcl not. re-
c~uter; that. is, bny the ontsicle goocl. In partienlar, in the lat.ter setup, tlre positive
~Ie~rnancl effec t clominates t.he negative strategic~ effec~t.. T1nIS wit.hoirt c~onsltrner re-entry
at the expert, the non-expert. bas inc~entives to improve Iris repair teclmology. Tbe forc~e
clri~~ink tbese resnlts is tbe following. lVithont re-entry at t.be expert., an in~re.ISe in 7
is octnally valned by all consnmers independent of their location. Wit.h re-ent.ry at t.hc
expert, howevc~r, c~onsumers located close t.o the expert benefit less than t.tiose 1~cz~Lrd
c~losc~ to tLe non-expert. Thns, wit.bont r~entry at, t.he expert an inc~rertse in y implic~s
a larger rlemancl effec~t ~~-ithont affc~ting horizontal clifferent.iat.ion. An incxe.ue in ~y
only mitigates tbe qilality difference betwc~en both sellers, sinc~e consnmers do not fac~c~
auy transportation c~osts afT.er a bacl experienc~e at. the non-expert. Tlma, incre:r.5inl; tbe
qnalit.y withont re-entry at the expert does not increase the importance of tr:ulsportation
c~osts, i.e. horizontal ciifferentiation.
The entric~s in Table 1 are the c~ritic~al valiles for 7;I t;i~~en pararnetric~ vallu~s of r, r.
ancl t. In other worcls, the "aggrcssivc-pricing" eqnilibrinm holcls for all 7 1-r't. Ta-
ble 1 illustrates tbat an increase in the expert's rost c positively affcc~ts the valne of
ry.q. The intnition is t.he following: an increase in the expert.'s cost stnutnre, nndonbt-
eclly, clecrc~ses his profits from serving only "failnres." This prac~tice, Ilowever, keeps
him from being exposed to a weakened cornpetitive position bec~ause of this hiRher cost
st.rnct.iue. Tberefore, only a lugber probabilit.y of the non-expert.'s snrc~ESS can make it
more profitable for the expert. t.o cíirec.t.ly cornpete with the non-expert. This e,XplalnS
the positive relationship bet.ween c and yA. An increase in the cost of transportation t,
however, makes it less at.tract.ive for both sellers to serve the whole market ancí, therefore,
negatively affects yA.18
t-1 1-2
c - 0 0.934 0.770
c - I O.JG7 0.820
Table I: Critic~al valnes for rya (for r- 10)
Proposition 2: Tliere is no Pquilibrium in purP strategic~s if the probabilitv of succc~ss
is suc1~ tóat max(7.ryc) C ry C ry'~ .
Figures 3o.-n ilhrstrate Proposit.ion 2: for max(ry", ryc) C ry G ry~ there exists no "aggressive-
pric~ing" eqnilibrium. That is, for intermediat.e probabilities of suc~ccnsfiil repair, an
"aggressive-pric~ing" cqicilibrium does not exist.. In addition, when the c~ost. of trans-
portation t dec~reascs, the c~ritieal valne ry~ inc~reas~. That is, a lower degrc~e of horizontal
differentiation incrcases the range of ry-valnc~s for ~~-1rich an eqnilibrirun in piire st.rategies
doe~s not exist. The non-exist.encr of an ecprilibrinrn in pnre st.rat.egies resiilts from t.he
non-conca~-it~. nf t.he expert,'s profit. fimct.ion. Two mntually exclnsí~~e sitnations should
be c~ousidered. First, thc expert. is indifferent bet,ween charging P~ ancí his monopoly
pric~c~ r- t r~uly if the non-expert sets the pric~e g(ry). SE~c~oncí, t.he expert. is indifíerent
bctweerr charging r- t and ~~~~ - f. only if thc~ non-oxpert. sets the pric~e rj. The non-
i~xpc~rt, liowc~vor, optimally c~.hargc~s another pric~e in response to the expert's priccs. TLc~
dtrshed Lest-rc:tipouse fnnctiou for thc~ uon-expcrt iu Fignrc~ 2 ilhcstrates Propositiou 2-
As tlie daslrecl line passes throcrglr the disc~ontiirnons part of the expert's best response,
uc~ c~ctuilibricmr iu pnrc~ strate~gies exists.'' 1'ropcrsition 3, lro~~r~.er, shows that for these
~-alncs ~f ~, thc~rc~ exists a imiyue eqirilibrinm in mixed strategies.
Proposition 3: If max(;i. tii) 5 ï~~i;~. tLc~rc~ exists a uniquc~ "nii.xcd-priciug" r~Guilitr
riurn (p11. q1r. rk"). In this equilihriurn thP non-r~apert charges qtir - inin(~~, q(~~)) rs.ith
jrmbahilitv onc~. TLe expert charges lris monopol~. price ~r - r- t w.ith probability o~'.
Iri this r~veut, all ~onsumcvs first r-isít the rion-expcrt. I~~ïth the rerriaining prohahilitr
1- r,', the expert charges p,~r - p(q(1)) if min(9,4(~)) -i~ and p.cr -q~~~ - t otLerwise.
~'E~rislu~~~s (1~JS9) model ttas identical features in the mntext of ~.oluntan~ export restrictions (see
also lini~man (1~JS9)).L')
Prop~isition 3 sa~-s that. ~lcpcuiliug ~iu tl~c p.u'tt~uctri~~ on~.ironnicnt. thc expcrt ,.r~tti-
~loniizc~s" hot~~iYn tlie n~ouopol~. prire auil ono of tho t~~-o followiug mntnalh~ es~~hitii~-c
~iltet'ntiti~-cs. Tlx~ first is sottiug a prii~e F~(q(~~)) sni~h tliat be clire~~tly attrarts ,uiuc bnt
u~~~t all ~~oiLtiiuncr5. Thc se~~oncl alteruative is to ~~barge x pri~~o rj~y - t sn~~h that all i~ou-
tiinucrs immc~liatelv ~'isit his shop. Harsattvi ( 1973) provides a rationalc for the abovc
"mized-prii~iu~" oqiiilihrinm bc ~~oustrn~~ting a relatc~cl "cíistiirbecl" gaiuc~. In tbis ~lis-
liu~be~l ~;ame, tlte expet't's ~~ost strnctnre e is subj~~t to some exogenons ran~lotn sho~~k,
the ~~ahic of ~~-hi~~h the oxpert kno~~~s ~~-ith c~ortaint3-. [n eontr:~.tit, the non-export fa~~es
iuurrt,ciuty abont its exaet valne. Iu adclitiou, sttppose the noti-expcrt bclic~~.es that tLo
c~xpert's i~osts a~rc itniformly ciistributecl at'o~uid c. Then, at the linut, .~.ti t.ltese~ pay-olf
rclated clistnrbau~~es ~.anish, the non-exp~~~rt.'s beliefs approa~~h the mixeei st.rategy e~iii-
librinui- ln oth~~r wordn, Harsanyi interprets the probabilities with ~~.hich the expert.
`rau~lomizes" in the [nixed str~ttel;y rontext, ss the non-expert.'s "rate of i~norauce"
abrnit tLe expc~rt's ~~ost structiire. Iu this sense, the expert's '7andomiring" bcha~.ior
t;ets pinitiecl ancl. therefore, be~~omc~s ~~ompletely deterministi~~.
Tu~o litniting ~~asc5 of Proposition 3 are ~~onsidcrecl. First, thcre is a"timid-pricing"
eqiiilibriinn (E~.~.. y.).) ~~~hc~u n~ 1. Iu this eqnilibriiirn p~. - r- t and qy'. - y(~r - I) - t
if 0 c qr - q(~). From Eq. ( 13) in Lemma 2, tlie expert's best response, indecd,
cxtnals p~, - r- t if 0 C~r C rl(~'). I3~~ assnmptiou 2. thc nou-~~xpcrt.'s hest respouse
is yT - ~~(r - t) - t if pT - r- t. In that ~~asc, all c~onsnmers first visit the tion-cxpert,
ancl the expert. serces only the failures. Both firms a~lopt a"timicl-priring" strategy the
non-e~xpert can c~harge a vei,v high pric~c since the expc~rt i.hargc~s his monopolti- pri~~e. The
expert's profit. eqnals (r-t-c)(1 -7) ancl t.he noti-expert's profit is ~(r-t) - t. Se~~oncl.
there is a"rompetitive-pricing" c~nilibrium (p~,q~) when cr -a 0 ~tincl ~shen t- 0. In
t.his eqnilibrinm thc non-expert c~harges qi - q(ry) - q~, - ryc, and the cxpert ~~harges the
perfcxt ~~ompetirive price c.
Proposition 4: If the probabiliCy of success at thc~ uon-rxpert is suHiciently low, i.e.
7 c 7~ - 1~(r - c), tLere exists a unique "timid-pricing" equilibriiim whom the expe~rt
rhaiges the nionopoly price p- r- t and the non-expert q - ry(r - t) - t.
Thc f~ill dark line in Figiire 2 ilbistrates the non-expert's best:response fimc~tion in t.hc~
"timicl-pricing" equilibrinm. All ~onsnmers first have a try at t.he non-expert alt.hongh'~t)
his repair tec hnology is ~~.eak. The expert has no inoeiit.ives to price aggressively as
his profits on the non-expert failiires are considerable. This allows t.he non-expert t.o
c harKe a rc~lati~-ely high pric~c~ o-~s we1L This eqnilihrium shows mlat.ively high pric~es, as
hoth sellern xrc~ uot c~ompeting dirertly with each other. The expert specializc~s in t.he
uorr-expert's faihues, whereas t.he non-expert c~o~~ers t.he entire market at. fir5t. inst.an~~e.
Notic.e that ~~~ithin the í,iarametric~ environment ~~-here t.he "t.imid-pric~iug" eqnilibriicm
applic~s, the nou-expert. wonld have incentivc~ in a first st.age t.o improve npon his repair
ic~~luiology. Thc re.~on is that t.his allows him to ask for a higher priae wit.hont. affcrting
his dernand. Thns tris profits iucre:r.se in ry.
In simi, the overall pic~ture for the cynilibrium looks as follows. For ~~ery low vahres
of ry, a"timid-pricing" eqnilibrium resiilts. Both sellers are specializing on their market
segment and do not ~~ompete fiemely. For intsrmediate ry, a"mixed-pricing" eyuilibriurn
oc.rirrs where the expert. randornizes over the monopoly pric~e and a lower price. For high
~~tc,lnes of ry, an "aggressive-pric~ing" eqnilibrinm pops np, a.5 it bec.omes interc~st.ing for
buttr sellers to attrac~t c~nnsnmc~rs dircx~tly to their 5hops.
5 Welfare
Tlii, serfiou c.ompares the `aggressiv~ pricinK' equilibrinm wit.h ihe Social optiinnm.
flic~ suc~ial plauner rhoosati thc~ indifferc~nt consnmer y- t~ir- sucL as t.o minimizc~ total
i~i)~~s (':
1 y
n~iu ~y" tpl~:~r f~ t(~ -:V)rl?~ f~ ~` (1- ~~)t(1 - y)~y f (1- ïlliv)~'. (15)
'~~~- . 11 ' 4~i' o
The first ic~rm in Lq. (15) is the total transportation c~o5ts of all oonsnmers going first
to the non-e~~ert. Thc sec~ond ter~n is interpreted similarly, bnt for all consumers going
rlirec~tly t.o the expert. The third term represents the transportation costs of all consumers
~~ho, be~~anse of faihire at the non-expert. ~-isit. t.he expert. Finally. the last. tcrm shows
thc c~xpert~s t.otal c~osts.
Soh~ing Eq. (15) for,yi~. ~~ields
~iv - ~~t ~ c) ~ld~
(1 ~ ~~)t31
In words, the indifferent consnmer's locat.ion becomes closer to t,he expert's location if
t.he probability of a snccessfiil repair at the non-expert. increases (8y~~~óry 1 0). Also,
au iucretue in t.he expert.'s margiual cost angments the frru~tion of consnmers that, first.
visits t.he non-expert (8,yi~~t3c ~ 0). Finally, an increase in t,he cost of transport.ation
decre~LSes the proportion of consumers going to the non-expert. first. (8y'~f3t G 0). The
indifferent consnmer is in the int.erior if ry G t~c. Snbstitnt.ing this into Eq. (15), one
arriv~s at an optimal social cost
C, - ry2(t t c)2
f o.st - ry2(t -1- c) }(1 - ry2(t, f c) )c.
2(1 ~- ry)t 1 f ry (1 f ry)t
The total surplns in the first:best solut,ion is then simply r- G'. If the social planner
cau rnnt,rnl botlr prices, the first-best solntion can easily be achieved: each pair of prices
resulting in tlre indifferent consiuner located at y~i, is optimal. Suppose the social planner
can only control the expert's price.~ Then, the first,best. solntion can still be achieved.
This c.~r readily be seen from Eqs. (1) and (16), where y - y[i, if q- ry(g~ - c).
Since t.he non-expert's best response is continuous, there exists a nniqne int.ersect.ion.
Following 1~Ienrer and Sí.ahi ( i99~), this is the :.onstrainc~ effi~i~nt ontcome. Bv contrtrst.,
if the social planner rur only control the non-expert's price, the first,best. sohttiou is not.
necessarily obt.ained.s Ifp- q~ry~-c passes through the discont.innons part of t.he expert.'s
best response, either too many or too few consumers direct.ly visit. the uon-expert..
Before stating the next, proposition, cíefine
tf t2f8t(cft)
ry'w - q(c f t)
(17)
The right,haud side of Eq. (17) is increasing with the rate of transportat.ion cost t; in
addition, it approaches zero when t vanishes. It is decreasing in t.he expert's marginal
cost c and approaches one when c tends to zero.
~This may be of int.erest when it is too costly to trace the non-expert's repair activities, e.g. only
the expert has an official Gcence for making repairs and the non-expert. illegally offers repair sen~ices.
sThis may be of interest when the expert has his location outside the social planner's azea of control;
e.g. abroad.Proposition 5: A socially efficient proportion of consnmc~rs first visit the non-expert
in tóe ~~aggressive-pricing' equilibrium only wlien ry- yic. and ry~ C ryiy.. If ryA C ry C
~,~t.. then to~ few consumers from an et6ciency point of view first visit the expert . If
max(ry;t, ryic,) C ry, then too rnany consumers 6rst visit the expert.
The entries in Table 2 aze the ry-vahies for which the market. out.come coincides wit.h the
socially efficient ontcome given the pararnetric values of r, c, and t. Table 2 shows that
in t.he mnnerical exarnples where c- 0, t.he probability of snccess at which the market.
ont.come coincides with the socially c.~fficient outcome is ryw - 1. As a consequence,
a c ornparison wit.h Table 1 makes clear t.hat ry;~ C L That is, when there are no cost
rlifferences, uot enongh consumers from an efHciency point of view clirc~c~tly visit. t.he expert
in any "aggressivcpricing" ec{nilibrium. In cont.rast, when c- 1, a comparison of Tables
1 and 2 ilhistrates t.hat max(ryic,,ryA) - ry;t c ry. In words, in the "aggressive-pricing"
c~nilibrinm wit.h snch a cost difference, t.oo many consiuners first. visit the expert.. All
consnmers bet.ween yiv and , y~ shonld, from an efíiciency point of view, first visit the
uoii-expert: the cost disadvanta~ige nsults in the expert charging too aggressive a price.
t-1 f-2
c - 0 1.000 1.000
c - 1 0.640 0.767
Table 2: nlarket ontconre is efficient for ry- ry~~. (for r- 10)
lu rhe ~~timicl-pricing" oquilibrinm, all consnmers first. visit. the non-expert.. This im-
plic~s that they potent.ially save the diHerence iu marginal cost betwecn the two suppliers.
Tho drawhack is t.hat the average transportation costs are higher, hti they potentialh~
encl np at the cxpert. The trade off betweeu t.hese t.wo costs cletcrmines whcther it. wonld
be optimal to force everybody t.o go direct.ly to thc expert or not.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper h.cs characterized price competit.ion between an expert. aud a nou-expert.. In
cont.rast wit.h the expert, the non-expert's repair tEY~hnology is not always successfirl. In
a location frainework which is representat.ive for other interpre~tations, consnmers require
a snccessfnl repair and seek to minimize their expectecí expencíit.nres. In the event ofan unsnccessfnl mat.ch at t.he non-expert, t}re consumer re-enters the market. and visits
the expert. This simple framework offers the following insights: when the non-expert.'s
repair tec.lmology is snfficiently succcssfirl, bot.h sellers charge a low and determínist.ic
price. Indced, the non-expert's low mrmber of failnres doc~s not. rnake it attract.ive for
the expert to charge the monopoly price. By doing this, he wonld only serve t.hose
c onsnmers who had an nnsnccessfiil match at. the non-expert. In t.his eqnilibrinm, both
sellers charge a deterministic price and some consumers first. visit. t.he expert.. When the
uon-expert's repair terlmology is of intermediat.e qualit,y, t,he higher number of failnros
incre.LSes t.he profitabilit.y of t.he expert's residual demand. In eqnilibrinm, the expert.
raudomizes between the monopoly price and a low price The non-expert, however,
c harges a deterministic price. If the expert charges lris monopoly price, trll consumers
first. visit. the non-expert. ['or low probabilities of successfiil repair at the non-expert.,
botlr sellers specialize on t.heir own segment and charge a relat.ively higlr tui~:v. The
expert specializes in the non-expert's faihrres and asks these consumers the monopoly
price. The non-expert. specializes in giving t.he conscirners' good a first repair.
Snppose t.here is a first stage in which t.he non-expert dcrides upon his repair technol-
ogy. Onr resnlts show t.hat t.he non-expert shonld miderinvest. in his rcpair technology
whenever the "aggressive-pricing" eqnilibrinm applies. The driving forcc i5 that a highcr
level of quality induces an aggressive response from the expert. The non-expert faces iu-
centives to improve upon his repair t.echnology whenever thc "timid-pricing'~ eqnilihrimn
applies, a.9 this allows hirn t.o increase }us price wit.hont losing demand.
The fact that consnmers re-enter the market at the expert. drastically reshapes conr-
pet.ition between both sellers. First, a repair t.echnology with low succc~ss probability
allows the expert to specialize in the non-expert.'s faihues. This sitnat.ion would never
ocenr withont, re-entry. 5c~c~ond, without. rcc:nt.ry, t.here is no discontinnity in the espert's
best response, aud hence no "mixed-pricing" eqnilibrium. Third, t.he magnitude of bot.h
the demarrd and strategic effect are modified. The reason is that with re-entry at the
expert., reducing vertical differentiation also increases horizontal different,iation. A wel-
fare analysis shows that. the market. ontcome wit.h aggressive pricing resirlts in t.oo few
consnmers directly visiting the expert. when there are no cost differences. In contrast,
too many consumers directly visit. the expert for high enough cost differences.
The following modifications to t.he simple model deserve a short. cíiscnssion. Snpposethe expert decides to price disr.riminate between the c~onsnmers who fitst. visited thc~
uon-expert's store (the faihires) and those who directly visit his st.ore. Two s~enarios are
c~onsidered. In the first scenario, only faihrres c~an prove they first visit.ed t.he non-expert.
Thc~e faihcres shonld be charged the highest price: the non-expert's repairing t.echnology
is sne~h that faihues c~an orily go t.o t,he expert's store for six~c~essfiil repair. In other words,
the expert. has a rnonopoly position with respeot t.o the failnres. The faihrres, certainly,
must. be given an incentive (a discount.) to reveal themselves. Offering a discount. to
t.he faihu~es, however, increases the number of consiuners first. visiting the non-expert.
Both the disc~ormt- and its effect on the incíifferent consnmer decrease t.he expert's profit.
Therefore, in this scenario it. is not opt.imal for the expert t.o price discriminate. In
t.he second scenario, the faihrres cannot. hide t.heir visit t.o the non-expert. Hence, t.he
expert conld c~harge these consnmers a higher price. Clearly, rnore consnmers will prefer
to cíirectly cisit the expert. This moves t.he position of the indifferent consumer to the
left (the demand effect). The non-expert, however, will reduce his price (the strat.egic
effect). A priori, it. is not clear whet.her the expert. opt.irnally shoiild price clisc.riminate.
Thc non-expert could also ronsider offering a No-Cure-No-Pay c~ontract. With such
a c~ontrart, all c~onsnmers who had an nnsna~essfiil match do not have to pay the non-
expert. In t.hi~ set:np, the indifferc~ut consnmer is loc~at,ed at ,y' such that ryy' f t,y' f (1 -
~)(~'-}-t(1 -r~')) - fi ft(1-Ij ). It turns ont that in t.he "aggressivapricing" eqniiibrinm
(see Proposition i) the norrc~xpert's price bec~onr~ cl;~ - y~~~. The int.nition is that, due.
to risk uentralit~v, the non-expert. is indifferent betwcen receiving q~~~ wit.h probabilit~~
~ nr q~ with rertainty. A similar intirition applies to the oonsumers. It follows that the
c:epert's pric~c ~i;r - pq, and the indifferent consumer y;~ -?~;1 do not ~hange. Summing
np, a No-C~rre-Nn-Pa~ c~ontrart does not alter the rc~nlts when all partics are risk-
nentral. For n low~ enongh degree nf risk aversion, the indiíTerc~nt consiirner w-ill c~ertaitilv
shift to the right given the expert's priee (thc~ demand effect). Since botL sellers a~t as
strategic complements, the introchiction of snch a No-Cure-No-Pay contract decreases
the~ expert's price. This strategic effect, however, diminishcs as the degree of risk aversion
increase;5. In the limit, when the degree of risk aversion tends to infinity, the non-expert
rarmot at.trac~t any consnmer whatever the expert's pri~e'
A similar interpret.ation nnder risk neutrality holds for an "o~.c Inriy os the stnrk. lasts"-
~See Che (199Fi) for an anal}~sis in a monopoly context w-ith so-called "customer return policies."'~)
c~ontrac t.. This sit.nat.ion arises if the expert fa~es no capacit.y const.raints, whereas the
non-expert has a capacity constsaint. Then consttmers are only served by t.he non-expert.
s,thjcx,t to the stoc~k being nnsold.to This induces t.he consnmers to incnr acíditional
t.ransportation c~osts when encling np at the expert. An example from finan~ial markets
is the following: an investor might c~onsider t.o t.rade on a financ~ial market via snbmitt,ing
a limit. order, or via a market maker. The lat.ter execntes his order with certainty, whereas
a limit order is only execnted with a certain probability. In the end, he rnay have to
swit~h to the market maker to have his order execnted implying addit.ional nncertaittty
aud waiting c~osts.~t
~[~l~'e .vssume that all consttmers h;r~.e the same probability of obtaining the good at the non-expert.
~~T~cu excellent o~rn~ie~is on the urganization of financial markets are Pagano aucí Riiell (1092) and
O'Hara (199G).7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Sinr.e Eq. (4) is concave in q, t.he non-expert's best response is
q- 0.5ry(p -~ t) for any y E[0, 1]. From Ey. (2), however, a necessary condition is that
ry(~~ f t) ) 0.5ry(Ti f t) ~ ry~ - t. The first. ineyuality is always satisfied. If the sccond is
not satisficxl. the non-expert's demand equals l. Ac~cordingly, the best rPSponse is ryp-t.
O
Proof of Lemma 2:
Firsr, notice that the expert's profit fimction is non-qnasi c~oncave due to t.he form of
thc~ dernancl funetion. However, it is qnasi-c~onoave for the t.wo regions between r and
(q f t)~y , aud (q f t)~ry and 0. This implies that the expert's profit fiutct.ion shows
two peals. Comparison of those two peaks yields the desired best;response function.
The first part ahows its peak at p- r- t due t.o the inelasticity of demand between
r- t and (q f t)~ry. The sec~ond part reaches its maximum at. t.he interior of t.he region
(q ~- t)~ry and it~ry - t, or at q~ry - t. The latter is again due t.o the inelast.icit,y of dernand
betweeu 0 and q~ry - t. In siun, we have to cornpare the expert profits for three possible
l~ric~c~s: r- 1, ihe interior, and y~~ - t. Cnmparison of t.hese profits yields the desired
li~t-re5ponse fnnrtion (ser lemma ? in text). Tlus proves lemma 2. ~
Proof of Proposition 1: The intersection of (8) with q- 0.5ry(p t t) yields the
equilibrinttt pric~es. The uon-expert.'s market share y;r follows from snbstituting pÁ and
q'r into Eq. (1). An "aggressive-pririn~" ~itilibrimm ~nly o~rnrs whenever 0 G rt~ G 1.
This implies that an ag~ressive eqnilibrium only oc~c~nrs for q(ry) G q.~. Therefore, a
uec~c;tisary and siitfic~ient. c~ondition for p;r - j,(qq) to be the expert's best resporrse is t.hat
it(~) G q.,~. In any "aggressivc~pric~ing" eqnilibrinm 0 G y;~ G L Let 0 G-~a G i solve
yn - 1, it follows fronr Eq. (14) that ~ 1 rya iu any "aggressive-pricing" equilibrium.
Finalh., for all ry ~ 7a we have that. ryA is the nniqne solution t.o q(ry) - q;t - 0. Observe
tt,at q:~' ~(7;:,), 7? ryA. o
Proof of Proposition 2: Snppose there is an "aggressive-pricing" eynilibrinm in
pirre strategies sitc~h that ~ G-y4, or eqnivalently qÁ G q(ry). From Lemma 2, it follows
that t.he expert's best response is to c~harge r- t. From Lemma 1, however, the non-
expert's best reply then cKluals -y(r - t) - t. Bnt g(,) G-y(r - t) - t. A c~ontradi~tion.27
Suppose ry G y~, then the non-expert's hest. rc, ~sponse is to charge ry(r - í) - t snch that,
a pnre strategy eqnilibrinm resnlts (see Proposition 3). Rer~all that y,-y follows from
assnmpt.ion 2. O
Proof of Proposition 3: If t.he non-expert charges q(ry), we know that the expert.
is indifferent bet.ween charging r- t or p(q). Since ktis profits are exactly ident.ical, the
expert. is ~tis we~ll indifferent by charging t,hese t,wo prices wit.h any probabilit.y cr and 1-cr,
respcrti~-ely. FYom the non-expert's best. response, t.he non-crxpert's profit. is incraasing
iu his price for all q C q~ (see Figitre 2), irrespective the price P charged by the expert,.
For all prices q~ C q C q2 (see Fignre 2), the non-expert's profit. is decreasing in its
pricc when p-~(q) but. increasing when p - r- t. For nll q2 C q, tho non-expert's
profit. is dccreasing in p. Thns, for all prices qi C q c qz, there exists a uniqne vahie
n" snch t.hat the non-expert's marginal profit eqnals zero. Since q~ C q(ry) c qzi t.his
also holds for r~(7). Uniqneness r~siilts from t.he non-expert.'s concave profit fnnction
and that the expert only wants t.o randomize when the non-expert charges q(ry). Since
cj(ry) C ~(r - t) - t, it. follows frotn Assumption 2 t.hat all consumers first. visit. t,hc
non-expcrt when the expert. charges his monopoly price. O
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose ry c yi - t~(r - c). This implie~s that. tLe best
response of the non-expc~rt. is to charge ry(r - t) - t, and for t.hc expert to chargr, thc~
monopoly pric~e r- t. O
Proof of Proposition 5: The proportion of cousnmera in the "aggressice~-pricing"
equilibrinm of Eq. (}4) and in the socially efficient ontrome of Ey. (16) depcnds on
ry. For positive valnes of f, the r.h.s. of these t.wo c~qnations are id~ntical only when
ry- ryii,. The socially right amoiurt of consnmers first visit the non-expert. if ancl only
if ~A -?~~,, or c~nivalently when -y - ry~~r,. Of conrse, in any "aggressive-pricing"
cqnilibrinm ry 1 ry~. As a resiilt, too few consnmcrs first visit the c~xpert when y~~t. c y;~,
t.hat. is for ry.4 C ry c y~r.. Similarly, too mauy consumers first. visit the expert. when
?In C Jw~ t.hat. is for max(ryá,ryiy.) G ry. O2~s
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